

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

May 25, 2001

TO: K. Fortenberry, Technical Director

FROM: D. Grover and M. Sautman, Hanford Site Representatives

SUBJ: Activity Report for the Week Ending May 25, 2001

Spent Nuclear Fuel Project (SNFP): Spent fuel cleaning and loading of Multi-Canister Overpacks (MCOs) continues to be delayed due to equipment problems in the fuel retrieval system, integrated water treatment system, MCO loading system, and the transfer bay crane. The majority of these problems are in equipment that if unavailable will halt fuel processing, even following the implementation of the production improvements currently planned. Mr. Grover will continue to follow the projects efforts correct these problems and minimize their reoccurrence. (III-A)

Tank Farms: In response to the Office of River Protection's (ORP) safety concerns letter, CH2M Hill Hanford Group (CHG) suspended all activities last Friday other than that required to maintain their authorization basis and the in-progress maintenance outage in AW Farm. CHG also provided ORP a list of vulnerabilities and the compensatory measures they were putting in place to address each vulnerability. These were discussed with the workforce during several meetings this week. A Safety Review Board will be established to review conduct of operations with respect to safety concerns. CHG also announced their new organization. Dale Allen is the Senior Vice President of Operations. Rick Raymond is the Vice President of Projects and Mike Payne is the Senior Vice President of Business Services and Performance Assurance. (1-C)

Plutonium Finishing Plant: The Richland Office approved a Justification for Continued Operations to address a positive Unreviewed Safety Question involving a new analysis of a fire in the 2736-ZB complex where 3013 cans will be staged and assayed. The risk was accepted subject to the development of a detailed control strategy for fire accident scenarios, aggressively minimizing combustibles in the Nondestructive Assay Laboratory to reduce the possibility of a flashover, submitting Limiting Conditions for Operation for the fire suppression and detection system, and performing a hazards analysis for handling cans pressurized in excess of 300 psig. The staff is currently performing a review of the analyses and controls. (3-A)

cc: Board Members